Just a couple of quick points, as I have relatively little problem with the response Matt recently offered about fine tuning his comments on "poststructuralisms" (and I put the word in quotes here more insistently than I would the word deconstructions because although I feel I can offer a reasonable explanation of the latter in a few screens or so, the former is so often used to cover so many texts -- in this case apparently from the historiographies and genealogies of Foucault all the way to the early Derrida in Matt's post (I hope the later Derrida, even he agrees would be something else -- surely, for instance, his work on the gift and on Europe and its future, for instance). Also, I would argue that both words should, whenever possible, probably be written in the plural (Derrida has taken to insisting on this these days within discussions of deconstructions as a way of reminding people that the word has come to stand for so many texts and readings and writings) since we are still talking about a rather heterogeneous collection of singular moments. Matt writes: >Now, when I note that Barthes eventually gives way to Foucault and the >poststructuralists, I have in mind the Foucault who himself is very >attentive to the problems inherent in trying to escape structure. While I agree that in some of his work F. is at least "attentive" to this concern (even moreso for instance in works we haven't mentioned such as his "History of Sexuality"), this attentiveness, it seems to me, more often collapses back into a structuralist's reliance on a fixed and readable concept of "discourse" as historicized than it does in, JD or in, say, Delueze and Guattari or even Lacan. But that's not what troubles me about all of this. It is, actually, the "gives way" and the notion that one can draw a line from Barthes to Foucault, when in fact, such a line would have a number of breaks and not be a recognizable line at all considering the differences between the two men's work. Clearly by the time Foucault renounces his archeological project in favor of a rewriting of Nietzchean genealogy (in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History" and many works thereafter) he is simply doing something altogether different from Barthes (though not, I think, necessarily "poststructuralist" even in the limited sense of "self-conscious" that Matt seems to be stipulating). In any case, the later Barthes (of say *Barthes on Barthes* -- his extremely problematic autobiography) seems to me under this definition to be far more "poststructralist" than anything Foucault wrote. The point here isn't a "who is-who isn't" one -- indeed the labels are confining, restricting, and in the case of work like Derrida's actually counterproductive (and JD does have a clear and powerful piece on this word and its problems entitled "Some Statements and Truisms About Neologisms, Newisms, Positisms, Parasitisms, and other Small Seismisms" collected in David Carroll's *States of Theory*, where he discusses the many mostrosities that too often accompany this word and remind us that such titles "do not respond, do not correspons to any classifiable identity, to any corpus which can be delimited (67).") The point here is simply that the history implied in the "Barthes gives way to Foucault and the poststructuralists" claim is both too neat *and* gets its history a bit wrong besides. Also, Matt writes: >Without going so far as to say >that the orignial stock of decon has been polluted, I note that the >critique of structure, after so noble a beginning, and through no fault >of its many honest practitioners, has slipped into a horrible >complacency. Well, only someplaces obviously -- and in many of those places it was always horribly complacent. However, in many other places, both here in the US but even moreso right now in Europe, this is not true at all -- and it is certainly not true, I think, in the work of people like Sam Weber and David Farrell Krell and Judith Butler and many, many others, including JD himself. A quick look, by the way, at the Derrida web pages that Peter Krapp has constructed out on the West Coast and in Germany can demonstrate this (I can give the URL laater if anyone is interested). On the other hand, there is always complacency in the academy and it has had a damaging effect on how these works are taught from the very beginning and will continue to fill sudents with misimpressions and with the horrifying belief that they don't have to read the specific texts. This is precisely why deconstructions' insistences on slow, deliberate, patient and careful reading and a respectful double affirmation -- its warnings about going too quickly -- are so necessary here and now. I must go and try and teach carefully myself at the moment. I hope this has been OK. Thanks again, --John