Re: text and links some might like to see

Responses below:

Robert Pollack wrote:

>Jim said:
><< But that's not at all what I was talking about. I was talking about the
>attitudes of scientists as a "group." I'm talking about the "social
>realities" of the current scientific community in the US, at least. They
>tend toward pragmatism and logical positivism philosophically, even if they
>don't consciously adhere to these philosophies, they tend to hold to some
>version of them. >>
>
>This is true and I never meant to disagree with it. Perhaps the problem is
>that I began this by responding to a post that is largely forgotten.
>
>I posted a series of links that included some criticism of Derrida and
>people popularly associated with him. You responded by suggesting (at least
>I thought you were suggesting) that such criticisms were inevitable,
>predictable, and dismissible on the grounds of the scientific mindsets and
>commitments of the people making them. Now, it might be that the current
>scientific community is largely as you say it is, but this -- since it is
>not a result of science itself -- is no evidence of anything about the
>specific individuals on those pages. I think that reading one of them
>(Chomsky) reveals in fact quite the opposite, that most of what you
>suggested was, at least of him, false. He has sometimes been criticized for
>things directly opposite what you were suggesting.
>
I wasn't so much speaking of the "scientific mindsets" of the people
making these judgments of Derrida, but the previous _philosophical_
commitments of most Brit and US scientists. These prior philosophical
commitments have nothing to do with the actual practice of science
itself -- it's quite possible to be a good scientist without having a
bent toward pragmatism, materialism, logical positivism, naturalism, or
analytic philosophy, but most scientists working today simply do. You
don't seem to be arguing with this -- it's simply my attempt to describe
the philosophical environment of a specific subculture (the scientific
community).

I never used the phrase "scientifically minded" -- that's too broad.

The last link you provided in this discussion validated my suspicion.
 The guy started out in the sciences and then drifted toward philosophy.
 He likes Popper. I don't know about the signatories on the letter you
posted. No doubt their reasons vary. It'd be interesting to see where
they're all coming from themselves.

First, this paragraph, but the meat of the differences here are really a
bit further down.

>This is where I think you are misunderstanding science, mathematics, and
>mathematical certainty. You don't need to talk about it. While talk and
>description and sharing are important for the benefits we receive from
>science, science is not about them and it doesn't depend upon them.
>
I disagree. This may have some theoretical justification, but has
nothing to do with the actual practice of the scientific community at large.

>Whether or not we have symbols for two and four (or plus and equals), two
>plus two will continue to equal four. The truth of it is not contingent
>upon the stability of the symbols (unless you argue that there is no number
>without symbol, which I think is ultimately an impossible assertion, but
>going much further with that would again require some philosophy of math
>which would probably be fruitless without a commitment to studying some math
>for a while).
>
This is the core of the disagreement. Philosophers like Derrida call
this into question. So people who think that it is an "impossible
assertion" that there is "no number without symbol" would, because of
their prior philosophical commitments, think Derrida is a loony. We
don't need to debate this point here, but it is the piont.

>And:
><< The words we use in this case actually mask what we're really
>constructing -- a reading we imagine an invented reader of the author's own
>time, one that has some characteristics similar to the author, would
>advocate. This has nothing to do with the author him or herself,
>necessarily. And even if it did, we don't and can't know. >>
>
>But I've not been seeing the author's association to the text as being
>merely that of a reader contemporary to the text's being written. The
>author is the writer of the text. Again, I expect that this makes little or
>no difference in the reading, but it doesn't yet seem so objectionable to
>me.
>
What I'm arguing is that regardless of how you "see" the author, how you
actually "treat" the author when you try to reconstruct authorial intent
is as a reader. You'll have to do a lot of work to get away from this.
 I don't think anyone who's ever argued for authorial intent as the
basis of textual meaning ever has.

> I feel (whether or not I'm right to do it) that I can associate what I
>understand of Shakespeare's words with Shakespeare the man every bit as
>firmly as I can associate what I understand of your words with Jim the man.
>Often this isn't very firmly at all, as our frequent misunderstandings have
>evidenced. I try to be open to the possiblity that I'm misunderstanding
>Shakespeare just as I'm to the possiblity that I'm misunderstanding you.
>But it doesn't seem stupid or absurd or meaningless for me to continue
>associating -- however prone to occasional error -- meanings I identify in
>your words with your intent.
>
That's fine, and it especially works just fine in a forum like this,
where we are all social contemporaries speaking approximately the same
version of English and can immediately correct one another. Now imagine
those misunderstandings we've had compounded by time and language, and
the fact that Shakespeare isn't here to correct our misunderstandings.
 It gets troublesome.

>I have thought it bizarre that you and John O. have insisted that a belief
>in an accessible authorial intent means that one is trying for a certainty
>that one cannot have. I have thought something quite the opposite to be
>true. Denying authorial intent can just as well follow from a desire for
>certainty that can't be had with authorial intent -- so one can assert that
>authorial intent doesn't matter and then have some degree of certainty in a
>"correctness," however qualified, in a reading. For if textual support is
>the standard, and the author's intent is irrelevant, why isn't any reading
>with textual support perfectly and 100% correct? I would suggest that it
>would necessarily be. Believing in an accessible authorial intent, on the
>other hand, means being always uncertain, having only possibilities, and
>being perfectly happy with that.
>
That's not how it was and is used, though. I believe, and John O. does
too, I think, that it's quite possible for a text to have mutually
contradictory, 100% correct readings. While you admit you can never be
certain of authorial intent (and you still need to justify its use given
this lack of certainty), it's very hard for you to argue convincingly
that the author can consciously intend the entire range of mutually
contradictory readings of his text available to his readers at the time
he wrote it. Authors generally only mean a few specific things by their
work, which takes on a life and meanings of its own when it's released.

>But we're talking about meaning in language, and this is not limited to
>subtle literary meaning. It appears to me manifestly true that if you can
>see a sensible plot in Hamlet, you are seeing some degree of meaning (and
>significant meaning) in the language. Now, I DID NOT say that this is all
>the meaning, sufficient meaning, or even most of the meaning. But it is
>"meaning" that (by sheer overwhelming probabilitiy) is the same for you and
>the author.
>
>Now, as you say, even THAT might get "tricky" as we get more and more
>specific -- that is to say, as we adjust our focus to increasingly subtle
>levels of "meaning." But it seems to me that if you can say that
>Shakespeare did intend for Hamlet to be the prince of Denmark, SOMETHING of
>authorial intent IS accessible to you. OF COURSE, that access becomes
>increasingly problematic and uncertain -- perhaps even as you suggest,
>ultimately closing itself off from us wholly and entirely -- as we move to
>subtler and subtler "meaning." But exactly how it becomes more problematic
>and uncertain, and how, when, and even IF it ultimately closes itself off
>entirely, is something that has not been explored very well here.
>
In our previous conversation, my criticism of authorial intent also
included the idea that the "ultimate closing off point" is really very
near to the surface -- that once you've said Hamlet is the prince of
Denmark, is mourning his father's death, suspects his uncle and dislikes
his uncle's marriage to his mother -- once you've said all these types
of things, you've said all you can say.

When you add them all up, you eventually wind up with a plot summary.

My denial of our accessibility to authorial intent is not meant to be
absolute. I feel confident, like you, that Shakespeare intended us to
believe Hamlet is the prince of Denmark. So what? If we can't move
beyond these kinds of statements by appeal to authorial intent -- and I
don't think we can very far, if at all -- then this appeal does us no
good.

I know you have a lot you want to say...these are just some of the
criticisms you'll need to eventually address.

Jim

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Received on Mon Mar 10 10:42:03 2003