Re: text and links some might like to see

Jim said:
<< But that's not at all what I was talking about. I was talking about the
attitudes of scientists as a "group." I'm talking about the "social
realities" of the current scientific community in the US, at least. They
tend toward pragmatism and logical positivism philosophically, even if they
don't consciously adhere to these philosophies, they tend to hold to some
version of them. >>

This is true and I never meant to disagree with it. Perhaps the problem is
that I began this by responding to a post that is largely forgotten.

I posted a series of links that included some criticism of Derrida and
people popularly associated with him. You responded by suggesting (at least
I thought you were suggesting) that such criticisms were inevitable,
predictable, and dismissible on the grounds of the scientific mindsets and
commitments of the people making them. Now, it might be that the current
scientific community is largely as you say it is, but this -- since it is
not a result of science itself -- is no evidence of anything about the
specific individuals on those pages. I think that reading one of them
(Chomsky) reveals in fact quite the opposite, that most of what you
suggested was, at least of him, false. He has sometimes been criticized for
things directly opposite what you were suggesting.

The scientific community as a whole might today be quite like you describe,
and every individual is culpable. My assertion was merely that the
scientific mindsets and commitments you blamed for the criticism of Derrida
cannot be responsible. I suggested that bigotry might be (perhaps even a
breed of bigotry very common in the scientific community), but not anything
having to do with science as science, or the pertinent commitments or
mindsets. Nothing about being a scientist necessarily precludes anyone from
being a good and thoughtful reader of Derrida, or of being a truthful,
legitmate, and worthwhile critic of him -- perhaps the people on those
webpages were not, but this fact, if true, is not a result of their being
scientifically minded.

And:
<< That's the point -- in order to "talk about" any "stable" phenomena, you
need a stable language. It doesn't have to be any one particular language,
but once you've chosen one it needs to work roughly the same way day in and
day out, without question. There's no point retreating behind the idea of
"concept" -- there are no concepts that we can share with others that aren't
represented by a sign system of some kind, whether math or vocal expression
or a written version of verbal expression. And that's the point of science
at this point in history, as a conglomeration of practiced disciplines --
one's findings must be shared with others for them to be meaningful. It is
the "talking about" or "sharing" that requires a stable language. If the
values for 2, 2, and 4 aren't stable, then we can't say that 2+2=4 and be
sure our readers will get what we're saying. >>

This is where I think you are misunderstanding science, mathematics, and
mathematical certainty. You don't need to talk about it. While talk and
description and sharing are important for the benefits we receive from
science, science is not about them and it doesn't depend upon them.

Whether or not we have symbols for two and four (or plus and equals), two
plus two will continue to equal four. The truth of it is not contingent
upon the stability of the symbols (unless you argue that there is no number
without symbol, which I think is ultimately an impossible assertion, but
going much further with that would again require some philosophy of math
which would probably be fruitless without a commitment to studying some math
for a while).

If you are watching a pendulum swing back and forth, back and forth, and
suddenly it comes down to the center and stops suddenly, without a remaining
twitch or vibration, you'll be shocked. You'll wonder WHY the hell that
happened. If you tell someone, they won't believe you. The sense you have
when it first stops does not depend upon language or any stable human
artifice, and it is the result of rarely considered principles inescapably
imbedded within you, upon which science stands.

And I suppose that this isn't really important anyway. Whatever you argue
about complex literary "meaning," I do not think that you can successfully
(at least without disavowing reason) extend the "instability" of symbols to
mathematical symbols and expect the instability to be such to make math
problematic. The very substance of the statements prevents symbol "shift."
Two can't start to change its meaning or two plus two will stop equaling
four. This isn't something that can sneak up on us. Two plus two equals
four (and 2+2=4), and that this is true after thousands of years of counting
on fingers, after being stated in countless systems of symbols, is evidence
that all symbols aside, two sets of twoness make fourness. It is a
conceptual truth, not contingent upon symbolic expression. Now the symbols
are very important -- what a difference, and what an amazing feat of human
ingenuity, to go from one one one one one to five. But this importance
shouldn't be confused with a reliance.

Then:
<< Right...I thought of this after I posted. I'd like to narrow this,
though. Is a work's "applicability" part of a work's "meaning"? If so,
then meaning obviously exceeds intent [. . . .] >>

What I said after you stopped quoting me was that I would like to modify
Tolkien's statement to make a distinction between applicability and meaning.
What you say above is correct, and, as has seemed to be so for a long time,
the root of this seems to be a difference in how we're using "meaning."

If we mean to include something applicable to a text in its meaning, then
insisting upon the authors intention and knowledge of THAT sort of meaning
is obviously absurd, since, as you say, some applicable things (nukes to the
one ring) weren't available to the author. I don't think anybody would
assert such a thing, though (because people tend not to assert obviously
absurd things). I want to make clear that what I have meant by "meaning"
(and, I expect, what everybody who's been arguing with you has meant by it)
does not include mere applicability -- but more on this later.

And:
<< The words we use in this case actually mask what we're really
constructing -- a reading we imagine an invented reader of the author's own
time, one that has some characteristics similar to the author, would
advocate. This has nothing to do with the author him or herself,
necessarily. And even if it did, we don't and can't know. >>

But I've not been seeing the author's association to the text as being
merely that of a reader contemporary to the text's being written. The
author is the writer of the text. Again, I expect that this makes little or
no difference in the reading, but it doesn't yet seem so objectionable to
me. I feel (whether or not I'm right to do it) that I can associate what I
understand of Shakespeare's words with Shakespeare the man every bit as
firmly as I can associate what I understand of your words with Jim the man.
Often this isn't very firmly at all, as our frequent misunderstandings have
evidenced. I try to be open to the possiblity that I'm misunderstanding
Shakespeare just as I'm to the possiblity that I'm misunderstanding you.
But it doesn't seem stupid or absurd or meaningless for me to continue
associating -- however prone to occasional error -- meanings I identify in
your words with your intent. And in fact it continues to seem silly to me
to remind myself that meanings I identify in your words have no necessary
connection to you. Surely they sometimes don't, because I sometimes
misunderstand you, but usually it works out, and so long as I'm confortable
without certainty, that's perfectly fine.

I have thought it bizarre that you and John O. have insisted that a belief
in an accessible authorial intent means that one is trying for a certainty
that one cannot have. I have thought something quite the opposite to be
true. Denying authorial intent can just as well follow from a desire for
certainty that can't be had with authorial intent -- so one can assert that
authorial intent doesn't matter and then have some degree of certainty in a
"correctness," however qualified, in a reading. For if textual support is
the standard, and the author's intent is irrelevant, why isn't any reading
with textual support perfectly and 100% correct? I would suggest that it
would necessarily be. Believing in an accessible authorial intent, on the
other hand, means being always uncertain, having only possibilities, and
being perfectly happy with that.

And:
<< I'm looking forward to this exploration, but for now I'll say that "plot
summaries" are far from the "meaning" of a text in any significant sense of
the word. Watching Hamlet performed, or reading Hamlet on the page, can
produce remarkable, varying responses in viewers/readers. Talking about
these responses gets closer to the "meaning" of a text, and goes far beyond
plot summary (which can sometimes get tricky if we get specific enough). >>

But we're talking about meaning in language, and this is not limited to
subtle literary meaning. It appears to me manifestly true that if you can
see a sensible plot in Hamlet, you are seeing some degree of meaning (and
significant meaning) in the language. Now, I DID NOT say that this is all
the meaning, sufficient meaning, or even most of the meaning. But it is
"meaning" that (by sheer overwhelming probabilitiy) is the same for you and
the author.

Now, as you say, even THAT might get "tricky" as we get more and more
specific -- that is to say, as we adjust our focus to increasingly subtle
levels of "meaning." But it seems to me that if you can say that
Shakespeare did intend for Hamlet to be the prince of Denmark, SOMETHING of
authorial intent IS accessible to you. OF COURSE, that access becomes
increasingly problematic and uncertain -- perhaps even as you suggest,
ultimately closing itself off from us wholly and entirely -- as we move to
subtler and subtler "meaning." But exactly how it becomes more problematic
and uncertain, and how, when, and even IF it ultimately closes itself off
entirely, is something that has not been explored very well here. The fact
of even the most mundane access to authorial intent indicates that access at
subtler levels is not immediately and obviously absurd, even if, upon
examination, it proves impossible.

This is all that I meant to point to with mention of plot as a sort of
"meaning."

All these side-posts have gotten in the way of posting the one I wanted to
this weekend (it's now unlikely that I'll get to it tonight). I do still
plan to get to it, though, but it might not be until Friday or Saturday.

-robbie
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Received on Mon Mar 10 00:35:11 2003