Re: text and links some might like to see

Responses below:

"L. Manning Vines" wrote:

> You're under no compulsion to agree with me, but I do believe that there is
> a valid distinction between true things and false things, and that both
> science and philosophy find true things (or continually improve their
> approximations of them, at least). Since it is necessary from these
> postulates that there can be no mutually exclusive truths, I must believe
> that science and philosophy are mutually compatible, and in fact quite
> complementary. They simply pertain to different (but usually similar)
> things.
>

We're missing each other because we're talking about two different things.
You're speaking of science as a abstract discipline. I'll just accept your
description of science and metaphysics for the time being, as disciplines
(there's no more point in arguing about that than arguing about Hegel here), and
agree that, theoretically, they don't necessarily contradict one another (esp.
if you're working within a Kantian framework).

But that's not at all what I was talking about. I was talking about the
attitudes of scientists as a "group." I'm talking about the "social realities"
of the current scientific community in the US, at least. They tend toward
pragmatism and logical positivism philosophically, even if they don't
consciously adhere to these philosophies, they tend to hold to some version of
them.

> And:
> << Oh, no, I'd disagree here. Science requires a stable vocabulary for it
> to do its job. Some of the humanities thrive on instability here. Some --
> Jim. >>
>
> So long as we're talking about pure mathematical concepts and their
> application
> to consistent physical appearances, I don't think this depends on a
> consistent vocabulary. -- robbie

That's the point -- in order to "talk about" any "stable" phenomena, you need a
stable language. It doesn't have to be any one particular language, but once
you've chosen one it needs to work roughly the same way day in and day out,
without question. There's no point retreating behind the idea of "concept" --
there are no concepts that we can share with others that aren't represented by a
sign system of some kind, whether math or vocal expression or a written version
of verbal expression. And that's the point of science at this point in history,
as a conglomeration of practiced disciplines -- one's findings must be shared
with others for them to be meaningful.

It is the "talking about" or "sharing" that requires a stable language. If the
values for 2, 2, and 4 aren't stable, then we can't say that 2+2=4 and be sure
our readers will get what we're saying.

We don't really need to talk about philosophy of math or about specific sciences
to apply this observation to our current discussion -- the hostility that
science, and scientifically minded philosophies, have toward philosophers like
Derrida.

> Incidentally, Tolkien wrote of hating allegory ever since he was
> sophisticated enough to know of its existence. He INSISTED that his writing
> was never to be taken as allegorical, though it is APPLICABLE.

Right...I thought of this after I posted. I'd like to narrow this, though. Is
a work's "applicability" part of a work's "meaning"? If so, then meaning
obviously exceeds intent -- in Tolkein's case, he couldn't possibly have
"intended" the one ring to be a symbol for nuclear weapons. But, at the same
time, it's quite reasonable to say that what Tolkein says about the one ring
"applies" to the US attitude toward its nuclear arsenal (to get specific), as
you said yourself.

So if meaning can exceed authorial intent, isn't appeal to authorial intent
limiting on meaning, and thus not only a useless appeal, but a dangerous one?

> I think that's about right. But why is authorial intent a "misdirected" way
> of grounding literary texts in social and cultural histories? Why not take
> the author as source and governor of the text, and the specific social and
> cultural history as the means to get to him (or, if impossible to get to
> him, exactly, as a means to get a closer approximation to him)?

1. For reasons I suggested above.
2. Because you're not ever, really, talking about the author -- as you say, it's
"impossible to get to him, exactly." That's why I say appeals to authorial
intent are "misdirected."

The words we use in this case actually mask what we're really constructing -- a
reading we imagine an invented reader of the author's own time, one that has
some characteristics similar to the author, would advocate. This has nothing to
do with the author him or herself, necessarily. And even if it did, we don't and
can't know.

> We know that Shakespeare was an especially bright fellow from the relevant
> historical circumstances who thought up the words we read. We probably
> cannot get any closer to him than that. If, after acknowledging these
> things, the reading is the same whether we think in terms of authorial
> intent or not, and if thinking in terms of authorial intent still
> acknowledges the final uncertainty, what is, in this context, the disavowal
> of authorial intent except the assigning of a dirty word?

I think I answered that above. It's misleading for the reasons I specified. I
think we need to describe what we're really doing and not use words that have no
bearing upon what we're really doing. Once we admit we can never really know
that we're representing the author, then we have to admit that what we are doing
is actually something else.

I think language matters too.

> I would expect that there are many levels of "meaning" with different
> degrees of subtlety, and that anyone with good English will get a good chunk
> of them quite like Shakespeare did. I'm sure the plot of Hamlet, for
> instance, is not different for you and Shakespeare. As we consider meanings
> of increasing subtlety, it gets dicier and there's probably no guarantee.
> Why I think textual meaning should be limited to the circumstances of the
> author, though, I hope to explore a bit later.

I'm looking forward to this exploration, but for now I'll say that "plot
summaries" are far from the "meaning" of a text in any significant sense of the
word. Watching Hamlet performed, or reading Hamlet on the page, can produce
remarkable, varying responses in viewers/readers. Talking about these responses
gets closer to the "meaning" of a text, and goes far beyond plot summary (which
can sometimes get tricky if we get specific enough).

Be careful that when you limit valid readings, you don't limit applicability as
well.

If you define a "valid reading" as one co-extensive with the author's possible
readings, then you're arguing in a circle because your definition is what we're
trying to establish by the definition.

Jim

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Received on Sun Mar 9 12:23:34 2003